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BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 Thekkedajh Menon appeals from a judgment in a criminal 
case in which he was convicted by a jury of violating 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 20 and 5450 by knowingly and willfully, with intent to defraud 
the United States, making out and passing through the customhouse 
false and fraudulent invoices and other documents in order to 
conceal the identity of the exporters of certain products, and of 
violating those same sections by reimporting shrimp that had 
previously been rejected as contaminated by the Food and Drug 
Administration ("FDA"). 
                     
018 U.S.C. § 2(a) states that, "[w]hoever commits an offense 
against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, 
induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a 
principal." 
0Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of § 545 state: 
 
Whoever knowingly and willfully, with intent 
to defraud the United States, . . . makes out 
or passes, or attempts to pass, through the 
customhouse any false, forged, or fraudulent 
invoice, or other document or paper; . . .  
 
Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or 
brings into the United States, any 
merchandise contrary to law . . . 
 
[s]hall be fined not more than $10,000 or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 
 
 Menon's first contention on appeal, a contention he 
failed to raise in the district court and hence one that we 
review for plain error, is that to obtain a conviction for 
passing false invoices under § 545, the government must prove 
that he intended to deprive the United States of revenue, not 
just that he intended to evade federal regulations.  Menon's 
second argument is that the evidence was insufficient to show 
that he reimported previously rejected shrimp, a point which 
ultimately turns on whether a search of Menon's office which 
exceeded the scope of a search warrant was nonetheless valid 
under the "plain view" doctrine even though the agent who 
happened upon the documents at issue did not appreciate their 
significance until she brought them to a more knowledgable agent. 
 Agreeing with Menon's construction of the the first 
paragraph of § 545 and holding that the district court's 
construction constituted plain error, we reverse his convictions 
for passing false invoices through the customhouse.  The meaning 
of "defraud" varies from statute to statute, see McNally v. 
United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2881 (1987), 
and here the evidence supports Menon's interpretation of 
"defraud."  When Congress codified the criminal code, it changed 
the language of § 545 (then § 1593 of title 19 (U.S.C. 1940 ed.)) 
from "defraud the revenues of the United States" to "defraud the 
United States" but it did not mean to change the substance of the 
statute; it meant to continue the previous requirement of an 
intent to defraud the revenues of the United States.  Thus, we 
continue to give the statute its former meaning, and, finding 
plain error on the basis that the district court's 
misinterpretation went to the existence vel non of criminal 
responsibility, we reverse Menon's convictions for passing false 
invoices.  However, we affirm Menon's conviction for reimporting 
previously rejected shrimp, disagreeing with his contention 
regarding the illegality of the search, and his less significant 
assignments of error. 
 Because we have overturned Menon's convictions on most 
counts, we must remand for resentencing.  On remand, the district 
court should not apply the enhancement for importation of seafood 
worth more than $2,000.  Although Menon's conviction on Count 140 
easily puts him over the $2,000 minimum for the enhancement, 
application of the enhancement is impermissible because it would 
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.  Although 
the enhancement was in effect at the time of Menon's sentencing, 
it was not in effect at the time of his conduct. 
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
 The FDA is responsible for ensuring the safety of 
seafood entering the United States.  In performing this function, 
the agency analyzes data to see if it establishes a pattern 
demonstrating that seafood which importers have bought from 
particular exporters is likely to be unsafe.  Foreign exporters 
which have a history of shipping contaminated goods are placed on 
a block list; shipments from these exporters are automatically 
detained, and the importer must obtain a private laboratory 
report demonstrating that the seafood is free of contamination 
before the FDA will release it.  Other exporters are placed in an 
intermediate category, which means the FDA is more likely to 
sample their products before admitting them into the country than 
it is to sample those of other exporters. 
 Menon was President and two thirds owner of Flag 
Imports, Inc. ("Flag"), a business that purchased seafood both 
overseas and domestically for resale to distributors.  On 
numerous occasions, Menon directed his employees to list falsely 
on invoices a different exporter of seafood than the one from 
which Flag had actually purchased the seafood.  By listing 
exporters with no history of contamination rather than the actual 
exporters, who were either on the block list or subject to an 
increased risk of surveillance sampling by the FDA, Menon 
intended to deceive the FDA so that Flag's imports entered the 
United States more readily. 
 Nonetheless, the FDA discovered that one of Flag's 
shipments, a March 22, 1991 shipment of 1200 cases of shrimp, 
contained salmonella.  It thereupon issued a Notice of Refusal of 
Admission for this shipment, and ordered that the cases be either 
exported or destroyed within 90 days.  On May 25, 1991, Flag 
shipped the shrimp to Jabeco Transport ("Jabeco") in Rotterdam, 
Holland.  The ultimate fate of that shrimp is a question of much 
moment in this case; the government contends that Menon illegally 
reimported it into the United States whereas Menon claims that 
there is insufficient evidence to prove reimportation beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 On January 19, 1993, a federal grand jury returned a 
142-count indictment against Menon.  Counts 1 through 110 charged 
that, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 545, see supra nn. 1 & 
2, Menon did knowingly and willfully, with intent to defraud the 
United States, make out and pass through the customhouse, false 
and fraudulent invoices and other documents in order to conceal 
that the exporter of these products had been block-listed by the 
FDA.  Counts 111 through 139 charged Menon with similar conduct 
with respect to seafood obtained from exporters in  the 
intermediate category.  Count 140 charged Menon with 
reimportation of shrimp that had previously been rejected as 
contaminated by the FDA, also in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 
545.  Finally, Counts 141 and 142 charged that, in violation of 
16 U.S.C. § 3372(d) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, Menon knowingly made and 
used false invoices and decoy packaging to conceal that shipments 
identified as shrimp from Bangladesh were largely composed of 
frog legs subject to automatic detention and special permit 
requirements. 
 During the course of the jury trial, the government 
voluntarily dismissed counts 16 and 33 of the indictment.  At the 
close of the evidence, the district court granted a judgment of 
acquittal on Counts 141 and 142 (the frog legs counts).  On March 
10, 1993, the jury found Menon guilty of all of the remaining 
counts.  Menon filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal on 
Count 140 alleging that the government had presented insufficient 
evidence of his guilt.  Menon also moved for a new trial, 
asserting that 1) the district court had improperly barred him 
from presenting evidence that no one had ever reported being sick 
as a result of Flag seafood;0 2) Count 140, alleging 
reimportation of contaminated shrimp "contrary to law," was 
deficient for failing to specify the law to which the 
reimportation was contrary; and 3) evidence seized during a 
search of Flag's property should have been suppressed.  The 
district court denied these motions.   
 The district court held a sentencing hearing after 
which it imposed concurrent sentences of 20 months on each of 
Counts 1 through 15, 17 through 32, and 34 through 140. The court 
also imposed concurrent terms of two years supervised release on 
each count of conviction, a total special assessment of $6,900, 
and a fine of $50,000.  The adjusted offense level of 22, when 
combined with a Criminal History Category of I, resulted in a 
guideline range of 41-51 months.  The district court then 
departed downward from this range based on the severe mental 
problems of Menon's wife. 
 Menon appeals the denial of his motions for judgment of 
acquittal and for a new trial as described on p.6 supra.  On 
appeal, Menon presses two additional arguments.  First, he 
asserts that his convictions for making out false invoices should 
be reversed because he did not intend to defeat the customs laws 
nor to defraud the United States government of money.  Second, he 
submits that the district court's fourteen level increase to his 
                     
0Because Menon only argues that this evidentiary decision related 
to his convictions for employment of false invoices and we are 
reversing those convictions, we do not reach the evidentiary 
issue on appeal. 
sentence violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. 
After considering the many difficult issues, we hold that 
paragraph 1 of § 545 does require an intent to deprive the United 
States of revenue and that Menon's convictions on counts 1-15, 
17-32, and 34-139 should therefore be reversed.  While we will 
uphold Menon's conviction on count 140 for reimportation of 
previously rejected shrimp, we agree with Menon that application 
of the sentencing enhancement for importation of valuable seafood 
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause and thus should not be repeated 
in his resentencing. 
 
II. THE MEANING OF 18 U.S.C. § 545 
 
 The jury convicted Menon of 137 counts of violating the 
first paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 545.  As we have noted supra at 2 
n.2, this paragraph makes it illegal to "knowingly and willfully, 
with intent to defraud the United States, . . . make[] out or 
pass[], or attempt to pass through the customhouse any false, 
forged, or fraudulent invoice."  The jury concluded that Menon, 
in his position as President of Flag, violated this provision by 
writing invoices that misrepresented the name of the seafood 
exporter from which Flag had bought the seafood it was importing. 
Menon contends that the district court misread § 545, because "an 
intent to defraud the United States" by passing false invoices 
"through the customhouse" requires 1) an intent to defeat the 
customs laws and 2) an intent to deprive the United States of 
revenue. 
 Menon's argument that § 545 requires an intent to 
deprive the United States of revenue would place a new gloss on a 
45-year-old statutory provision that has been interpreted to the 
contrary by two courts of appeals, see United States v. Borello, 
766 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. McKee, 220 F.2d 
266, 269 (2d Cir. 1955); United States v. Kurfess, 426 F.2d 1017, 
1019 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 830 (1970). 
Moreover, because Menon failed to argue in the district court 
that § 545 requires an intent to deprive the government of 
revenue, we review Menon's contention on appeal for plain error. 
See Fed.R.Crim.P. 30, 52(b). 
 Rule 52(b) provides that "plain errors or defects 
affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were 
not brought to the attention of the court."  We find plain error 
"sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage 
of justice would otherwise result."  United States v. Frady, 456 
U.S. 152, 163 n.14, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1592 n.14 (1982)).  See also 
Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 949 F.2d 677, 681 (3d Cir. 
1991).  We 
look on a case-by-case basis to such factors 
as the obviousness of the error, the 
significance of the interest protected by the 
rule that was violated, the seriousness of 
the error in the particular case, and the 
reputation of judicial proceedings if the 
error stands uncorrected -- all with an eye 
toward avoiding manifest injustice. 
 
United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200, 205 (3d Cir. 1988).  Here, 
because "the challenge to the construction of the statute goes to 
the existence vel non of criminal responsibility, we think that 
the error, if such it was, would affect [Menon's] due process 
rights and would constitute plain error."  United States v. 
Cusumano, 943 F.2d 305, 309 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 In a very similar case, in which the plaintiff argued 
that the district court had improperly instructed the jury that 
the mail fraud statute did not require an intent to deprive 
another of money or property, we indicated that if the district 
court had given such an improper instruction, it would have 
constituted plain error.  See United States v. Piccolo, 835 F.2d 
517, 519 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1032, 108 S. Ct. 
2014 (1988).  As in that case, we think that, assuming Menon's 
interpretation of the statute is correct, the district court's 
failure to instruct the jury that § 545 requires an intent to 
deprive the government of money or property constituted manifest 
injustice and thus constituted plain error.  And, despite the 
contrary decisions of two courts of appeals, we hold that Menon's 
interpretation of § 545 is correct.0  
 While the meaning of "defraud the United States" 
generally extends beyond defrauding the government of revenue, 
the history of § 545 demonstrates that Congress did not intend 
such a broad reading here.  We first note that until recently, 
the Supreme Court generally interpreted "defraud" to extend to 
actions preventing the government from carrying out its lawful 
functions even when the government did not lose any revenue. This 
                     
0Because we agree with Menon that the first paragraph of § 545 
requires an intent to deprive the government of revenue, we do 
not reach his contention that it requires an intent to defeat the 
customs laws.  
interpretation took root in Hammerschmidt v. United States which 
analyzed the statutory predecessor of 18 U.S.C. § 37, a statute 
making it illegal to "conspire to . . . defraud the United States 
in any manner or for any purpose."  See 265 U.S. 182, 185, 44 S. 
Ct. 511, 511 (1924) (interpreting Comp. St. §10201).  In 
Hammerschmidt, the Supreme Court concluded that 
[t]o conspire to defraud the United States 
means primarily to cheat the Government out 
of property or money, but it also means to 
interfere with or obstruct one of its lawful 
governmental functions by deceit, craft or 
trickery, or at least by means that are 
dishonest.  It is not necessary that the 
Government shall be subjected to property or 
pecuniary loss by the fraud, but only that 
its legitimate official action and purpose 
shall be defeated by misrepresentation, 
chicane, or the overreaching of those charged 
with carrying out the governmental intention. 
 
Id. at 188, 44 S. Ct. at 512.0 
 Recently, however, the Supreme Court has significantly 
narrowed the category of statutes in which the meaning of 
"defraud" extends beyond a deprivation of property rights.  In 
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 
2881 (1987), the Court interpreted the mail fraud statute, which 
made it illegal "to defraud" or to "obtain[] money by means of 
                     
0See also United States v. Barnow, 239 U.S. 74, 75, 36 S. Ct. 19, 
20 (1915) (holding that 35 Stat. 1088, 1095 (1913), prohibiting 
individuals from "falsely assuming or pretending to be an officer 
or employe[e] acting under the authority of the United States" 
"[w]ith intent to defraud either the United States or any person" 
applied even when an individual did not demand or obtain anything 
of value); United States v. Plyler, 222 U.S. 15, 32 S. Ct. 6 
(1911) (holding that § 5418 Rev, Rev. Stat., which prohibited the 
forging of any public record "for the purpose of defrauding the 
United States," applied regardless of pecuniary gain). 
false or fraudulent pretenses," to require a finding that the 
defendant intended to deprive others of property or money.  18 
U.S.C. § 1341.0  In so doing, the Court rejected "a long line of 
court of appeals decisions that had interpreted the statute as 
proscribing schemes by government officials to defraud citizens 
of their intangible rights to honest and impartial government." 
United States v. Asher, 854 F.2d 1483, 1488 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(emphasis in original).  In justifying its decision, the Court 
quoted Hammerschmidt, 265 U.S. at 188, 44 S. Ct. at 512, for the 
proposition that, "the words to defraud `commonly refer to 
wronging one in his property rights by dishonest methods or 
schemes.'"  McNally, 483 U.S. at 359, 107 S. Ct. at 2881.  The 
Court concluded that this common understanding combined with the 
rule of lenity meant that the mail fraud statute required an 
intent to deprive someone of money or property.  See id. 
 The Court distinguished the actual ruling of 
Hammerschmidt on the basis that the mail fraud statute aimed to 
prevent fraud against any member of the public, while the statute 
discussed in Hammerschmidt aimed to protect the United States 
against fraud.  A statute that has for its "`object the 
protection and welfare of the government alone'" aims to prevent 
fraud in a broader sense than deprivation of property rights, but 
a statute aiming to prevent fraud against members of the public 
                     
0Congress responded to McNally by adopting Pub.L. 100-690, Title 
VII, § 7603(a), Nov. 18, 1988 which states that, "[f]or the 
purposes of this chapter, the term, `scheme or artifice to 
defraud' includes scheme or artifice to deprive another of the 
intangible right of honest services."  18 U.S.C. § 1346. 
is likely using fraud in its usual, narrower sense.  Id. at 358, 
107 S. Ct. at 2881 n. 8 (quoting Curley v. United States, 130 F. 
1, 7 (1st Cir. 1904)).0 
 Another case distinguishing Hammerschmidt is United 
States v. Cohn, 270 U.S. 339, 343, 46 S. Ct. 251, 252 (1926). 
There the Supreme Court was faced with interpreting the meaning 
of Section 35 of the Penal Code, 40 Stat. 1015 (1918), which 
provided that actions "`for the purpose of obtaining or aiding to 
obtain the payment or approval of' any `claim upon or against the 
United States . . . for the purpose and with the intent of 
cheating and swindling or defrauding the Government of the United 
States' . . . shall be punishable."  The Court construed section 
35 as requiring the defendant to cheat the government out of 
                     
0But cf. United States v. Tuohey, 867 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1989). 
Tuohey  noted that 
 
despite the Court's dictum regarding section 
371 in McNally, the McNally decision appears 
to leave the broad construction of "defraud" 
in section 371 in some doubt.  In McNally, 
the Court overruled virtually unanimous case 
law that had broadly defined "defraud" in the 
mail fraud context to extend to non-property 
"good government" frauds.  The similarities 
between section 371 and section 1341 are 
striking.  Both date from the same period in 
our history . . . . Both have long been read 
to extend to non-property frauds.  Both have 
been criticized as broad vague bases for 
criminal liability. 
 
Id. at 536-37.  Nonetheless, as the Ninth Circuit ultimately 
held, although the reasoning of McNally with respect to § 1341 is 
in tension with that of Hammerschmidt with respect to § 371, 
McNally did not overturn Hammerschmidt and in fact suggested that 
Hammerschmidt applies to most statutes that contain the language 
"defraud the United States." 
property or money.  The Court distinguished Hammerschmidt on the 
grounds that the term defraud within section 35 "is used in 
connection with the words `cheating or swindling,' indicating 
that it is to be construed in the manner in which those words are 
ordinarily used, as relating to the fraudulent causing of 
pecuniary or property loss."  Id. at 346-47, 46 S. Ct. at 253. 
 The message we derive from this potpourri of Supreme 
Court cases is twofold.  First, the meaning of "defraud" must be 
interpreted in the context of the particular statute that uses 
the term.  In each case in which the Court has evaluated the 
meaning of "defraud," it has determined the intent of Congress 
based on the purpose of the particular statute and on the 
surrounding statutory language.  Second, an intent to defraud 
generally requires an intent to deprive someone of property or 
money but does not generally require such an intent in the 
context of statutes making it illegal to defraud "the United 
States."  It seems appropriate therefore to construe § 545 as 
prohibiting acts that prevent the United States from carrying out 
its statutory duties unless there is countervailing evidence on 
the meaning of the statute. 
 Here, strong countervailing evidence exists.  Menon 
points out that § 1593 of title 19 (U.S.C. 1940 ed.), the 
predecessor statute to 18 U.S.C. § 545, required that the 
defendant intended "to defraud the revenues of the United States" 
(emphasis added).  Although Congress left out the language "the 
revenues" when it recodified the federal criminal code in 1948, 
Menon contends that Congress made it clear that it did not not 
intend to make any substantive change in the statute by making 
this deletion.  Thus, he concludes that the concept "defraud the 
revenues" is still a part of the statute. 
 As support for his view that Congress intended no 
substantive change, Menon cites the House Report which states 
that, "[r]evision [of the Criminal Code], as distinguished from 
codification, mean[s] the substitution of plain language for 
awkward terms, reconciliation of conflicting laws, omission of 
superseded sections, and consolidation of similar provisions." 
H.R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in 18 
U.S.C.A. 439, 440. The House Report does not indicate that 
substantive changes were included as part of the revision.  See 
id.  The House Report concludes that, "[t]he reviser's notes are 
keyed to sections of this bill and explain in detail every change 
made in text," id. at 448, and W.W. Barron, chief reviser of the 
code, testified to the House Committee on Revision of the Laws 
that "[e]very substantive change, no matter how minor, is fully 
explained [in the reviser's notes].".  Id. at 460 (emphasis 
added).0  Because the reviser's notes for § 545 say only that 
                     
0Similarly, Charles Zinn, the Law Revision Counsel for the House 
Committee on the Judiciary, testified that: 
 
In the work of revision, principally 
codification, . . . keeping revision to a 
minimum, I believe the rule of statutory 
construction is that a mere change of wording 
will not effect a change in meaning unless a 
clear intent to change the meaning is 
evidenced . . . . It is clearly indicated in 
each of those revisers' notes whether any 
change was intended so that . . . a mere 
change in language will not be interpreted as 
"[c]hanges were made in phraseology,"  H.R. Rep. No. 304, 80th 
Cong., 1st Sess. at A46, and do not specify that any substantive 
changes were intended, Menon concludes that the current statute, 
like its predecessor, requires that the defendant have intended 
to deprive the United States of revenues to which it was 
entitled.0 
 We agree.  Although we might ordinarily discount 
legislative history, we are unwilling to do so where that history 
consists of committee reports and statements by the chief reviser 
and where the statutory change we are interpreting occurred in 
                                                                  
an intent to change the law unless there is 
some other clear evidence of an intent to 
change the law. 
 
Hearing before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Judiciary 
Committee on H.R. 1600 and H.R. 2055, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1947) (statement of Charles J. Zinn), reprinted in 18 U.S.C.A. 
417, 515. 
0Menon makes one additional argument.  He asserts that if we 
interpret § 545 as not requiring an intent to deprive the 
government of money, that section will become duplicative of 
§542, which makes it illegal to introduce "into the commerce of 
the United States any imported merchandise by means of any 
fraudulent or false invoice."  18 U.S.C. § 542 (1988). 
 However, §§ 542 and 545 overlap regardless of how we 
interpret § 545.  Because § 542 extends to any use of a 
fraudulent invoice for the purpose of importing goods into the 
United States, it will prohibit all conduct prohibited by § 545, 
i.e., every use of false invoices that pass through the 
customshouse, whether we interpret § 545 broadly or narrowly. 
This means that even if we interpret § 545 narrowly, the 
government will not be left without a remedy in future cases --it 
can choose to prosecute conduct such as Menon's under § 542 
rather than under § 545. 
 The converse is not true, however: section 542 applies 
to some conduct not covered by § 545 even if we interpret § 545 
broadly.  That is because § 542 applies regardless of whom an 
actor is attempting to defraud, see 18 U.S.C. § 542, while § 545 
requires a specific intent to defraud the United States. 
the context of codification of the entire criminal code.  In that 
context, Congress was unlikely to have been able to carefully 
consider every change made to prior statutes.  We think it was 
reasonable for Congress to rely on representations made to it by 
the chief reviser, among others, that all substantive changes 
were explicitly set forth in the revisers' notes and for Congress 
to indicate that it intended no other substantive changes. Absent 
a compelling need, we should not read as substantive a change 
initiated by the revisers and probably not considered by 
Congress. 
 At a minimum, we think that the legislative history 
makes the meaning of "defraud the United States" in § 545 
ambiguous given that, as we have seen, the meaning of defraud 
varies from statute to statute.  As the Court did in McNally, we 
rely on the rule of lenity to hold that because the meaning of 
defraud is ambiguous in the context of § 545, that section 
requires an intent to cause a deprivation of property or money. 
As Menon points out, and the government does not deny, the 
government made no showing that he had such an intent.  Thus, we 
must reverse his conviction on Counts 1-15, 17-31, and 33-139. 
 
III. COUNT 140 
 
 Count 140 of the indictment charged Menon with 
violating the second paragraph of § 545.  That paragraph makes it 
illegal to "fraudulently or knowingly import[] or bring[] into 
the United States, any merchandise contrary to law."  18 U.S.C. 
§545.  The government contends that after it ordered Menon to 
export or destroy a certain shipment of contaminated shrimp under 
the authority of 21 U.S.C. § 381 (granting the FDA the authority 
to refuse to admit adulterated food into the United States), 
Menon exported the shrimp but then reimported it into the United 
States in violation of the order and of 21 U.S.C. § 331(a), which 
prohibits the introduction of any adulterated food into 
interstate commerce.  Menon argues that 1) the indictment lacked 
the requisite specificity; 2) much of the evidence the government 
used to prove Menon's guilt was the fruit of an illegal search 
and hence should have been suppressed, and 3) there was 
insufficient evidence to convict.  We reject all of these 
contentions. 
 
 A. Specificity of the Indictment 
 Count 140 of the indictment charges that Menon did: 
knowingly and willfully import merchandise 
into the United States contrary to law, in 
that the defendant did unlawfully reimport 
approximately 696 cartons of shrimp which had 
previously been rejected by the FDA because 
they were found to be contaminated by 
salmonella when they were originally imported 
by the defendant. 
 
Menon argues that the indictment was defective because it 
indicated that he imported merchandise contrary to law but failed 
to specify which law.  He asserts that, as a result, the 
indictment failed to provide him with adequate notice of the 
charge against which he had to defend himself. 
 Menon is correct that the indictment did not specify 
the statute he had violated; however, it did specify the actions 
Menon took in enough detail that proof by the government that he 
had taken these actions would have sufficed to prove that he had 
violated a particular law.  The indictment clearly charged that 
Menon had reimported rejected and contaminated shrimp; such 
reimportation is illegal under 21 U.S.C. § 331, which prohibits 
introduction of adulterated food into interstate commerce.  Thus, 
the factual specificity of the indictment was sufficient to put 
Menon on notice of the law he had allegedly offended.  See United 
States v. Bowe, 360 F.2d 1, 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 
961, 87 S. Ct. 401 (1966) (holding sufficient an indictment which 
did not cite the statute violated but which "advised the 
appellants of the essential elements of the offenses with which 
they were charged and stated facts showing the illegal aspects of 
the importation."  The court explained that the claim of 
insufficiency was "`made in a mood of technicalism appropriate 
only to an era now fortunately past.'" Id. (citations omitted).) 
 As we explain in the margin, the cases upon which Menon 
relies are distinguishable, because all involved indictments that 
failed to specify facts sufficient to constitute a violation of 
any law.0  In contrast, in this case, the indictment specified 
which of Menon's actions were contrary to law. 
                     
0In Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434, 19 S. Ct. 254 (1899), 
the Supreme Court held that an indictment charging the defendant 
with the importation of diamonds contrary to law was 
insufficient.  The Court wrote: 
 
  
 B. Legality of the Search 
 1) Background 
 On April 15, 1992, government agents searched Menon's 
office and the desk of his secretary Cathy Carroll pursuant to a 
valid search warrant.  The warrant authorized a search of these 
areas for "[o]riginals and copies of blank invoices bearing the 
name of Abad Fisheries," the company Menon often falsely listed 
as the exporter of seafood Flag was importing.  (Search Warrant, 
                                                                  
The allegations of the count were obviously 
too general, and did not sufficiently inform 
the defendant of the nature of the accusation 
against him.  The words, "contrary to law," 
contained in the statute, clearly relate to 
legal provisions not found in section 3082 
itself; but we look in vain in the count for 
any indication of what was relied on as 
violative of the statutory regulations 
concerning the importation of merchandise. 
The generic expression "import and bring into 
the United States," did not convey the 
necessary information, because importing 
merchandise is not per se contrary to law, 
and could only become so when done in 
violation of specific statutory requirements. 
 
Id. at 437, 19 S. Ct. at 455.  See also  Steiner v. United 
States, 229 F.2d 745, 748 (9th Cir. 1956) (holding indictments to 
be defective, because they "failed to state what law . . . the 
importation [of psittacine birds] was contary to, or in what 
respect such importation was contrary to law"); Babb v. United 
States, 218 F.2d 538, 541 (5th Cir. 1955) (holding that the 
"indictment should have alleged some fact or facts showing that 
the cattle in question were imported or brought in contary to 
some law; and that it is not enough to say that they were 
imported or brought in `contrary to law'").  In none of these 
cases did the indictment specify the statute defendant's actions 
were contrary to, or the actions defendant had taken that were 
sufficient to constitute a violation of law.   
dated April 15, 1992).  In addition to the documents covered by 
the warrant, Michael I. Scott, Senior Special Agent with the 
United States Customs Service, who oversaw the search, instructed 
the agents to look for any other blank invoices and for documents 
regarding Jabeco, the company to which Flag had shipped the 
shrimp rejected by the FDA and from which he had allegedly 
reimported these shrimp (leading to his indictment in Count 140 
for importing seafood contrary to law). 
 Scott assigned Ida Almeida to search Carroll's desk 
while Scott and other agents searched Menon's office.  When 
searching Carroll's desk, Almeida discovered a file marked Abad 
Fisheries which she brought to Scott, who was in the adjacent 
office.  She continued her search of the desk and found four 
documents with Jabeco's name on them which she also brought to 
Scott.0  Scott testified that when he glanced at one of the 
Jabeco documents, he noticed the words "Jabeco" and 
"reprocessing."  Because his prior investigation of Menon had 
revealed that Flag and Jabeco had collaborated on three prior 
illegal shipments of irradiated food, these words on the document 
signalled Scott that it evidenced criminal activity.  Scott then 
read the entire document and decided to seize it.  Because he 
assumed that the other documents were likely to be interrelated 
with the first one, he decided to seize them as well.0 
                     
0The government only introduced three of these documents into 
evidence; thus, the admissibility of the fourth document is not 
at issue.  MNT 6. 
0As Scott was departing with these documents as well as others, 
Flag's controller, John Guerriero objected to the seizure of any 
documents other than those specified in the warrant.  JA 890.  
 Menon moved to suppress some of the evidence obtained 
in the April 15 search including the Jabeco documents, arguing 
that the agents had exceeded the scope of the warrant.  The 
district court denied his motion, holding that the documents fell 
within the plain view doctrine because Scott only had to glance 
at the first Jabeco document in order to ascertain the probable 
incriminating nature of that document and because Scott had 
probable cause to conclude that the other documents were 
interrelated with that one.  We agree. 
 
  2) Analysis 
 
 The Supreme Court has allowed officers to seize 
incriminating evidence in plain view during the course of a 
lawful search because such a seizure "does not involve an 
intrusion on privacy.  If the interest in privacy has been 
invaded, the violation must have occurred before the object came 
into plain view."  Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 141, 110 
S. Ct. 2301, 2310 (1990).  In Horton, the Supreme Court set forth 
three requirements for valid seizures of evidence in plain view. 
First, the officer must not have violated the Fourth Amendment in 
"arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly 
                                                                  
After a conversation with Scott which may or may not have 
involved some pressure from Scott, Guerriero agreed to allow 
Scott to copy the documents.  JA 882, 826.  The district court 
concluded that, given the totality of the circumstances, 
Guerriero had consented to the seizure without any governmental 
coercion.  Because we find that the documents were in plain view, 
we need not reach the question of consent.   
viewed."  Id. at 136, 110 S. Ct. at 2308.  Second, the 
incriminating character of the evidence must be "immediately 
apparent."  Id.  Third, the officer must have "a lawful right of 
access to the object itself."  Id. 
 We first note that the deliberate decision by the 
agents to search for Jabeco documents does not in and of itself 
make the seizure of such documents illegal.  The Supreme Court 
has specifically rejected the requirement, proposed by the 
plurality in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 
2022 (1971), that the discovery of the evidence be inadvertent: 
The fact that an officer is interested in an 
item of evidence and fully expects to find it 
in the course of a search should not 
invalidate its seizure if the search is 
confined in area and duration by the terms of 
a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant 
requirement.  If the officer has knowledge 
approaching certainty that the item will be 
found, we see no reason why he or she would 
deliberately omit a particular description of 
the item to be seized from the application 
for a search warrant. 
 
Id. at 138, 110 S. Ct. at 2309.  Nonetheless, even though an 
officer can keep his or her eye out for particular objects while 
conducting a lawful search, the Court has made quite clear that 
the "plain view" doctrine cannot be used to expand the scope of a 
legal search -- there must be "scrupulous adherence" to the 
requirement that the search be limited to the time and place 
necessary to find the items listed on the warrant.  Id.   
 Menon argues that Scott's statement to his agents that 
he was "interested in documents related to . . . Jabeco" 
essentially told these agents to search beyond the scope 
authorized by the warrant in violation of the first Horton prong. 
Menon then asserts that Almeida proceeded to do just that when 
she continued to search Carroll's desk after finding the Abad 
file.  The government responds that Almeida continued the search 
because she hoped to find more Abad documents and thus found the 
Jabeco documents in the course of a permissible search. 
 It is possible that Almeida interpreted Scott's 
instructions to give her the authority to search for Jabeco 
documents even after her search for Abad documents was complete. 
And it is possible that Almeida continued her search of the desk 
even after she was fairly confident that she had obtained all of 
the Abad documents.  We think, however, that a subjective inquiry 
into her state of mind is unnecessary.  Given the fact that a 
subjective inquiry would almost certainly yield the same result 
as an objective inquiry and that "evenhanded law enforcement is 
best achieved by the application of objective standards of 
conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective 
state of mind of the officer," Horton, 496 U.S. at 138, 110 S. 
Ct. at 2308-09, we hold that a government agent has discovered 
evidence within the scope of the search allowed by the warrant if 
the agent's search fits within the literal terms of the warrant 
and is a reasonable means of obtaining the objects described in 
the warrant. 
 Almeida's discovery of the Jabeco documents meets that 
requirement.  Almeida's search fell within the scope of the 
warrant; the warrant gave the government the authority to search 
the desk for Abad documents and it was reasonable for Almeida to 
continue to do so even after finding the Abad file.   Any 
reasonable agent looking for evidence in a clearly circumscribed 
area would continue the search until she was certain that no more 
evidence existed which could not happen until the entire desk was 
searched. 
 Menon next argues that it was not immediately apparent 
that the Jabeco documents constituted evidence of criminality, 
and hence that the search violated the second Horton prong.  This 
argument divides into two sub-parts.  First, Menon avers that it 
was not immediately apparent to Almeida that the Jabeco documents 
constituted evidence of criminality.  According to Menon, as soon 
as she saw that the documents were not Abad documents, she should 
have replaced them rather than bringing them to Scott.  She did 
not, he continues, bring them to Scott because she thought that 
he might determine they were Abad documents.  In Menon's 
submission, Almeida's movement of the documents constituted an 
impermissible seizure, and Scott's glance at the documents 
constituted an impermissible search, i.e. it constituted an 
invasion of privacy not in any way helpful in conducting the 
search authorized by the warrant. 
 We can dismiss Menon's argument that Almeida's movement 
of the documents constituted a seizure with relative ease, 
because it did not "meaningfully interfere with [his] possessory 
interest" in the documents to any extent greater than if Almeida 
had brought Scott to the documents.  See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 
U.S. 321, 324; 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1152 (1987).  However, Menon's 
argument that Scott's glance at the documents constituted a new 
search which required probable cause is a forceful one given the 
Supreme Court's emphasis on the particularity of the warrant 
requirement, the further requirement of immediate apparency, and 
the goal of preventing officials from enlarging a specific 
warrant "into the equivalent of a general warrant to rummage and 
seize at will."  Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 748, 103 S. Ct. 
1535, 1547 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 Menon's contention receives a boost from Hicks, in 
which the Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of stereo serial 
numbers obtained by moving some stereo equipment.  See 480 U.S. 
at 325, 107 S. Ct. at 1152-53.  The move was not justified by the 
exigent circumstances which had justified the entrance of 
officers into the apartment in the first place and hence 
constituted an invalid search: "[T]aking action, unrelated to the 
objectives of the authorized intrusion, which exposed to view 
concealed portions of the apartment or its contents, did produce 
a new invasion of respondent's privacy."  Id. 
 This case is potentially distinguishable from Hicks on 
the ground that movement of the stereo in Hicks revealed to the 
officers private objects and information that no governmental 
agent had seen previously; in contrast, Almeida brought documents 
to Scott at which she had already glanced.  Thus, Scott's view of 
the documents did not constitute either a new search or a new 
seizure -- Menon had no more privacy interest in the documents 
after Almeida had glanced at them. 
 In Hicks, the Court indicated that the movement of the 
stereo was dispositive; "the mere recording of the serial numbers 
[on the stereo] did not constitute a seizure" (emphasis added). 
See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 324, 107 S. Ct. at 1152.  By ruling that 
the officer's movement of the stereo constituted an illegal 
search, the Court implied that, just as the mere recording of the 
serial numbers did not constitute a new seizure, it did not 
constitute a new search either.  This was true even though the 
police on the scene revealed the serial numbers to outside 
officers who checked those numbers for information unrelated to 
the exigent circumstances that had brought the police into the 
apartment.  Indeed, the Court explicitly stated that "a truly 
cursory inspection -- one that involves merely looking at what is 
already exposed to view, without disturbing it -- is not a 
`search' for Fourth Amendment purposes, and therefore does not 
even require reasonable suspicion."  See id. at 328, 107 S. Ct. 
at 1154; cf. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 119-23, 104 
S. Ct. 1652, 1659-61 (1984) (where Federal Express employees had 
opened package and seen bags of white powder and then replaced 
the bags, government removal of these bags did not constitute a 
new search, since it "enabled the agent to learn nothing that had 
not previously been learned during the private search"); Illinois 
v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771, 103 S. Ct. 3319, 3324 (1983) ("The 
plain-view doctrine is grounded on the proposition that once 
police are lawfully in a position to observe an item firsthand, 
its owner's privacy interest in that item is lost."). 
 Not only did Almeida's glance at the documents 
potentially destroy any privacy interest in preventing others 
from taking a similar look, but it is also important that here, 
unlike in Hicks, the officials unquestionably could have legally 
obtained all of the information they did obtain.  In Hicks, no 
police officer had legitimate plain view access to the serial 
numbers on the stereo.  Here, the Jabeco documents came into 
plain view in the course of a search within the scope of the 
warrant.  If Scott had searched Carroll's desk himself initially, 
or had done so after Almeida's search to make sure that she had 
found all of the Abad documents, he would legitimately have been 
able to glance at the Jabeco documents as part of his search for 
Abad documents.   
 Based on just such potential access by all officials in 
the house to the discovered materials, many courts have held that 
government officials other than the one who legitimately 
discovers materials can look at them (at least if the officials 
are already in the house).  As the First Circuit explained, the 
police "may be limited by the shared knowledge and experience of 
the officers otherwise lawfully on the premises," but "[t]he 
executing officers are not limited by the fortuity of which 
officer first happened upon the evidence."  United States v. 
Johnston, 784 F.2d 416, 420 (1st Cir. 1986).  See Crowder v. 
Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 821 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Newton, 788 F.2d 1392, 1395 (8th Cir. 1986); but cf. United 
States v. Syzmkowiak, 727 F.2d 95, 99 (6th Cir. 1984) (where 
officer who saw gun in plain view had to call in serial numbers 
to determine whether possession of the gun was illegal, the 
incriminating nature of the weapon was not immediately apparent). 
 Nonetheless, Menon has a strong counter-argument in 
addition to his reliance on Syzmkowiak, supra.  The very reason 
Almeida brought the documents to Scott is that he was better 
equipped to understand their contents than she was -- thus, his 
glance was likely to reveal private information that had not been 
revealed to Almeida when she glanced at the documents.  Imagine 
for example that the police are conducting a lawful search for 
cocaine.  In the course of his search, an officer sees a document 
written in French lying face up on a table in plain view.  His 
glance at the document reveals nothing to him about its contents 
because he does not understand French and he calls over another 
officer who speaks French.  The second officer glances at the 
document and thereby obtains a cursory understanding of the 
meaning of the document.  This understanding might not reveal 
information helpful to the police, but it might instead reveal 
information about the fully legal, private love affairs of the 
resident of the house.  Surely the glance of the second policeman 
constitutes at least an incremental invasion of privacy beyond 
that caused by the glance of the first officer.              
 Quite arguably Almeida caused such an incremental 
invasion of privacy here by exceeding the scope of the search 
warrant.  Unlike Almeida's actions in continuing to search the 
desk after finding a file marked "Abad," her actions in bringing 
the documents to Scott would not seem to be part of a reasonable 
effort to carry out the search for Abad documents, for it is 
apparent that her actions led to an additional glance at the 
document beyond that reasonably needed to fulfill the purpose of 
the intitial warrant.  Moreover, the original rationale for the 
plain view doctrine does not apply under this analysis:  the 
invasion of privacy involved in Scott's looking at the documents 
had not already taken place when Almeida brought the documents to 
him, nor was it certain that it was going to take place.  Scott 
may well not have conducted a search of the desk himself.  Thus, 
Almeida's actions were part of an effort to give Scott access to 
information that he had not been authorized by a search warrant 
to receive and that he would not inevitably have seen in 
conducting his own search.  
 When analyzing an analogous situation to the one here, 
a leading treatise on search and seizure questions sets forth 
precisely the type of argument Menon is making.  In evaluating 
whether a policeman who crosses a room to copy down an exposed 
stereo serial number after he has already found the gun for which 
he had a search warrant violates the Fourth Amendment, the 
treatise notes that: 
[t]rue, it is no search to see `what is 
already exposed to view,' but . . . the 
serial number was exposed in an abstract 
sense but was not exposed to this officer 
until he crossed the room, an activity on his 
part which was (to again use the Hicks 
majority's language) `unrelated to the 
objectives of the authorized intrusion' and 
thus not permitted under the Fourth 
Amendment.  This means that even in those 
cases where an identifying characteristic is 
discovered without moving the object, a 
troublesome scope-of-warrant execution issue 
may be presented concerning why the officer 
was within reading distance of the serial 
number.   
 
Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 4.11 at 105 (2d ed. 1987) 
(Sup. 1994). 
 Nonetheless, we decline to hold that Almeida's actions 
in bringing the documents to Scott were impermissible. 
Ultimately, we agree with the courts of appeals that have decided 
that the immediate apparency of criminality should be measured, 
at a minimum, by the collective knowledge of the officers on the 
scene.  See supra at 28.  First, we think this holding is 
supported by the weight of Supreme Court precedent, which 
suggests that once an object has come into plain view in the 
course of a legitimate search, any privacy interest in preventing 
a cursory inspection of that object has been destroyed.  Second, 
we think that the case law is correct to strike the balance in 
this way.  The French letter example presents a rare case; in 
most cases, once one officer has glanced at an object, any 
private information that can be revealed at a glance, will have 
been revealed -- except for evidence of illegal activity 
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment.  See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 
123-24, 104 S. Ct. at 1661-62 (holding that a test that merely 
disclosed whether or not a particular substance was cocaine did 
not compromise any reasonable expectation of privacy and 
therefore did not constitute a search).  The typical case will be 
the revelation of serial numbers on a gun which require a 
database to identify but which reveal no information beyond 
whether the gun is legal or illegal. 
   Moreover, if we were to require the officer who came 
across an object in the course of his or her own permissible 
search to understand the relationship of the object to 
criminality, the police would probably respond by assigning the 
most knowledgable officers to conduct searches or by having 
multiple officers search the same area.  The invasion of privacy 
would end up being as great; all that we would have accomplished 
is that the police search would cost more and be less efficient. 
Finally, we note that we could hardly prevent the officer who 
first saw an object from remembering what he or she saw and 
probably even testifying about it, which means that any 
additional invasion of privacy from revelation of the information 
to others is likely to occur anyway.  Cf. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 
119, 104 S. Ct. at 1659 ("Respondents do not dispute that the 
Government could utilize the Federal Express employees' testimony 
concerning the contents of the package.  If that is the case, it 
hardly infringed respondents' privacy for the agents to re-
examine the contents of the open package.")  Thus, we hold that 
Almeida's actions in bringing the Jabeco documents to Scott did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
 Menon then argues that Scott's own glance at the Jabeco 
documents was too searching to meet the "immediately apparent" 
requirement.  But we have explained, Scott was entitled to glance 
at the documents to the same extent that Almeida was.  Almeida 
was entitled to look at them carefully enough to determine that 
they were not blank Abad invoices.  See United States v. 
Santarelli, 778 F.2d 609, 615-16 (11th Cir. 1985) ("Given the 
fact that the search warrant entitled the agents to search for 
documents . . ., it is clear that the agents were entitled to 
examine each document . . . to determine whether it constituted 
evidence they were entitled to seize under the warrant.").  The 
district court found that upon his brief glance at the first 
Jabeco document, Scott noticed the words "Jabeco" and "for 
reprocessing purposes"; the court also found that these words 
provided him with probable cause to read the entire document 
because Scott had strong reason to believe that Flag was 
illegally importing irradiated food from Jabeco and Scott knew 
that "reprocessing" was a euphemism for irradiation.  We have no 
reason to hold that these findings were clearly erroneous.  
 As to the other two Jabeco documents, Scott testified 
that "the thing that was significant to me was that they were 
interrelated" to the first document because they all said Jabeco 
and were all from the same file.  The district court found that 
Scott's interrelationship conclusion was warranted and that this 
provided him with probable cause to read the two documents 
carefully.  Again, we decline to disturb these findings. 
 In sum, because 1) the Jabeco documents came into plain 
view in the course of Almeida's search of the desk; 2) Almeida's 
search of the desk was reasonable under the terms of the warrant 
which entitled her to search that desk until she found all of the 
blank Abad invoices that the desk contained, and 3) in glancing 
at these documents long enough to determine that they were not 
blank Abad invoices, it was immediately apparent, using the 
collective knowledge of the officers on the premises, that the 
documents were evidence of criminal activity, we hold that the 
search and seizure of these documents did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
 C. Sufficiency of the Evidence on Count 140 
 Finally, Menon contends that, even if we affirm the 
district court's decision to admit all of the evidence found in 
the search, the government did not adduce sufficient evidence 
that he "fraudulently or knowingly import[ed] or br[ought] into 
the United States, any merchandise contrary to law" by 
reimporting the shrimp that had been rejected by the FDA.  He 
argues that all of the government's evidence on shrimp travelling 
from Jabeco to the United States relates to shrimp with different 
specifications (hence different shrimp) from the shrimp initially 
rejected by the FDA.  As a result, importation of this shrimp was 
not "contrary to law." 
 The shipment rejected by the FDA consisted of 1,200 
cases of shrimp ranging in size from 15/20 per pound to 21/40 per 
pound, with a total weight of 42,864 pounds.  These 
specifications come from a bill of lading within the file of 
Sperduto, Spector, & Company ("Sperduto"), the firm Flag had 
engaged to conduct an annual audit of its books.  The bill of 
lading for the shrimp shipped from Jabeco to the United States, 
however, indicated there were 696 cases at 11,681 pounds, and the 
invoice stated that the size of the shrimp was 300/500 per pound 
(much smaller than the rejected shrimp).  Thus, it does appear 
that the shipment of shrimp sent to the United States was not the 
same as the one rejected by the FDA.  However, the government 
argues that the documents related to the shipment from Jabeco to 
the United States were falsified and that the shipment did in 
fact consist of the same shrimp.  By finding Menon guilty, the 
jury agreed with the government.  The district court denied 
Menon's motion for judgment of acquittal. 
 The standard in deciding whether to grant "a post-
verdict judgment of acquittal is the same as that which the trial 
court applied.  We must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict and presume that the jury properly 
evaluated credibility of the witnesses, found the facts, and drew 
rational inferences."  United States v. Iafelice, 978 F.2d 92, 94 
(3d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).  The court may overturn a 
guilty verdict only if no reasonable jury could find the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  See United States v. 
Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 1987).  Although the question 
is a close one, we think that a reasonable jury could have found 
Menon guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 First, the government presented evidence that a Flag 
employee told its auditor Sperduto that some of the shrimp was 
the same.  Jay Rosner, a CPA who worked for Sperduto on the Flag 
audit, testified that, while attempting to trace the whereabouts 
of the 1,200 cases of shrimp, he took notes based on statements 
made by someone at Flag: 
Flag sent 1,200 cases of shrimp to be IQF'd 
at Rotterdam . . . [A]ttached is the copy of 
the bill of lading from the shipment from 
Flag to Rotterdam.  Also attached is the 
invoice . . . for processing the shrimp and 
the bill of lading from Rotterdam to New 
York.  696 cases were stored in Union 
Warehouse Terminal on 8/20/91. 
 
Although Rosner testified that no auditor ever verified that the 
696 cartons were connected to the 1,200, he made it clear that 
"[t]hose were Flag's assertions."  JA 457, 475. 
 Rosner's testimony is backed up by the fact that in 
Sperduto's files relating to the 1,200 rejected cases of shrimp 
was a bill of lading and a storage document pertaining to the 696 
cases of shrimp.  Joseph Sperduto, another CPA with the Sperduto 
firm, testified that the reason the documents would be in that 
file is that the client or the person conducting the audit had 
provided them and had indicated they were connected.  JA 442-44. 
 Although this evidence does not explain who at Flag 
said that the two shipments were related or why the 
specifications of the two shipments were different, it evidences 
a connection, especially given that the original source was Flag 
itself.  Of course, it may be that someone at Flag or at Sperduto 
simply erred in relating the two shipments,0 but it was 
reasonable for the jury to conclude otherwise, at least when this 
evidence was considered in light of additional government 
evidence. 
                     
0For example, John Guerriero, the comptroller at Flag who 
maintained its books and records, indicated that, when asked to 
provide backup documents to the auditors about the 1,200 cartons 
of shrimp, he probably took the documents related to the 696 
cartons of shrimp from the payment files (A 93), JA 146.  He did 
not explain why he took these particular documents from the 
payment files.  Perhaps Guerriero had no explanation and simply 
made a mistake. 
 Because Menon knew that Sperduto was attempting to 
verify the location of the 1,200 cases of shrimp, Menon wrote 
Jabeco requesting that Jabeco inform Sperduto that it possessed 
the 1,200 cases of shrimp as of June 30, 1991.  Jabeco then wrote 
Menon and Sperduto acknowledging such possession.  The letter 
continued, "[t]his lot has been shipped back to New York on or 
about 6th July, 1991 for estimated arrival at New York, July 
17th, 1991."  While this evidence alone does not definitively 
prove that Flag directed that the original shrimp be sent back to 
the United States or that the 1,200 cases actually arrived in the 
United States, it does tend to prove that the original 1,200 
cases of shrimp were shipped back from Jabeco to New York.  When 
this evidence is combined with the fact that Flag connected the 
696 cases with the 1,200 cases and the 696 cases actually arrived 
in New York, it makes it much more likely that the two shipments 
were actually the same. 
 Finally, upon receiving his copy of the letter Jabeco 
had written to Sperduto, Menon crossed out the statement that the 
shrimp had been sent back to New York and wrote at the bottom of 
the letter, "Bert! Please omit in second."  Menon then sent a fax 
to Bert Cornelisse at Jabeco which said, "[w]ith regards to the 
letter you faxed to me, if you have not sent this to Sperduto, 
Spector & Co., please do not do so until you telephone me."   A 
jury could reasonably conclude that by taking these actions, 
Menon was attempting to prevent Sperduto from discovering that 
the rejected shrimp had been sent back to New York.0  Given this 
evidence of consciousness of guilt and an attempt to cover up 
that guilt, and the fact that the jury simultaneously found Menon 
guilty of 137 counts of falsification, the jury might well have 
resolved the fact that the specifications of the shrimp that 
arrived in New York differed from those of the shrimp rejected by 
the FDA by concluding that Menon had falsified the specifications 
on the shipment to New York.   
 In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the government, see Iafelice, 978 F.2d at 94, we 
hold that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict on 
count 140.0 
                     
0There are other possible explanations for Menon's letter with 
respect to the Jabeco letter, but they are far less plausible.  
For example, Menon may have wanted Jabeco to delete the sentence 
about re-shipment of the shrimp because these shrimp had not in 
fact been sent back to the United States and he wanted to ensure 
the information provided to the auditors was correct. But if this 
were the explanation, he would have wanted Jabeco to correct the 
information provided to the auditors even if the original letter 
had already been sent to them; he would not have told Jabeco to 
correct the letter only if Jabeco had not yet sent the letter to 
the auditors.  Moreover, this explanation does not signify a 
reason why Jabeco would have made a mistake as to the destination 
of the shrimp.  At all events, the exclamation point in the line 
"Bert! Please omit in second" conveys a sense of urgency unlikely 
to have been present had Menon simply desired to correct a 
mistake. 
0The defendant presented evidence from an independent 
warehouseman, Robert McLaughlin, that the shrimp which returned 
to the United States did not meet the specifications of the 
shrimp rejected by the FDA.  JA 629-30.  However, the government 
impeached McLaughlin's testimony by showing that it was based on 
business records rather than personal knowledge and that it was 
possible that the specifications on these business records 
resulted from a transfer of information from the allegedly 
falsified specifications on the materials accompanying the shrimp 
to the United States. JA 617, 625, 630.  In viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the government, we assume that the 
  
IV. THE SENTENCING ISSUES 
 
 The district court sentenced Menon under Sentencing 
Guideline § 2Q2.1.  U.S.S.G. § 2Q2.1 (1992).  Under this section, 
his base offense level was six.  U.S.S.G. § 2Q2.1(a).  His 
offense level was increased by two because he had a commercial 
purpose.  U.S.S.G. § 2Q2.1(b)(2).  It was further increased by 
fourteen under subsection (b)(3)(A), which provides for an 
enhancement according to the table in § 2F1.1, "if the market 
value of the fish, wildlife, or plants exceed[s] $2,000." 
U.S.S.G. § 2Q2.1(b)(3)(A). 
 At a minimum, we must remand for resentencing.  The 
market value of the seafood at issue in Count 140 ($141, 899), 
although more than $2,000, is far less than the market value of 
the seafood at issue when the district court sentenced Menon --
which included the value of the seafood in Menon's other 137 
counts of conviction.  Thus, the enhancement which would be 
applicable under the table in § 2F1.1 would no longer be 14 
levels.  But Menon contends that the enhancement is not 
applicable at all, because application of the enhancement 
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.  We agree. 
 Even though such an enhancement was part of the 
guidelines when Menon was sentenced, it was not part of the 
                                                                  
jury made a reasonable credibility judgment that McLaughlin's 
testimony was not helpful.  
guidelines at the time of Menon's conduct.  The conduct at issue 
in count 140 occurred in July of 1991 when the sentencing 
guidelines provided for an upward adjustment only "if the market 
value of the specially protected fish, wildlife, or plants 
exceeded $2,000."  See U.S.S.G. § 2Q2.1(b)(3)(a) (1990).  Had 
Menon been sentenced for reimporting previously rejected shrimp 
at that time, he would not have been subject to the upward 
adjustment because shrimp are not "specially protected."  But 
Menon was sentenced in June 1993, when the guidelines provided 
for an enhancement if the "market value of the fish, wildlife, or 
plants exceeded $2,000."  U.S.S.G. § 2Q2.1(b)(3)(A) (1992). 
 The general rule is that a sentencing court must apply 
the guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing.  See United 
States v. Cherry, 10 F.3d 1003, 1014 (3d Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 1991); 18 U.S.C. 
§3553(a)(4); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(a)(1993).  But changes in 
sentencing guidelines that enhance the penalty offend the Ex Post 
Facto Clause of Article I of the United States Constitution.  See 
Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 421, 431-35, 107 S. Ct. 2446, 2451-54 
(1987); Kopp, 951 F.2d at 526.  In Miller, the Supreme Court 
explained that a retrospective law that disadvantages the 
offender violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, but that a change in 
law that "does not alter `substantial personal rights,' but 
merely changes `modes of procedure which do not affect matters of 
substance'" does not.  482 U.S. at 430; 107 S. Ct. at 2451. Under 
this framework, the enhancement utilized here is 
unconstitutional. 
 Applying the enhancement in the 1992 guidelines which 
does not contain the "specially protected" substantially 
disadvantages Menon retrospectively.  Menon had no notice at the 
time he acted that his punishment would be so steep.  The 
government responds in two ways.  First, it contends that 
application of the 1992 guidelines did not retrospectively harm 
Menon because the Sentencing Commission intended the guidelines 
in effect during Menon's conduct to apply to importation of 
valuable seafood regardless of whether it was specially 
protected.  Second, it contends that the district court actually 
applied the 1990 guideline and merely interpreted it by reference 
to the subsequent amendment.  For analytical purposes, we 
conflate these two arguments into the single proposition that the 
1989 guidelines, interpreted in light of earlier guidelines and 
later ones, did in fact provide an enhancement regardless of 
whether the seafood was "specially protected." 
 The government defends this proposition by pointing out 
that prior to 1989 there were two separate enhancement provisions 
-- one within section 2Q2.1 for specially protected fish wildlife 
and plants, see U.S.S.G. § 2Q2.1(b)(3)(A) (1988), and one within 
section 2Q2.2 for fish, wildlife and plants generally, see 
U.S.S.G. § 2Q2.2(b)(3)(A) (1988).  Had Menon's conduct occurred 
prior to November of 1989, that conduct would have been subject 
to the enhancement for seafood generally.  The Commission 
intended the 1989 amendment to "consolidate two guidelines that 
cover very similar offenses," U.S.S.G. § 2Q2.1, app. C, amend. 
209 (1989), rather than to make any substantive changes.  But in 
consolidating sections 2Q2.1 and 2Q2.2, the Sentencing Comission 
adopted the enhancement provision from § 2Q2.1 which only applied 
to "specially protected" fish.   The Commission explained in 
1991, that the language "specially protected" had been 
"inadvertently retained" when the sections were consolidated. See 
U.S.S.G. § 2Q2.1, app. C, amend. 407 (1991).  Thus, the 
government argues that the intent of the Commission was always to 
apply the enhancement to importation of seafood worth more than 
$2,000, regardless of whether it was specially protected or not. 
   The government asserts that the 1991 amendment deleting 
the "specially protected" language combined with its reference to 
that language as having been "inadvertently retained" in the 1989 
consolidation means that the 1991 amendment was merely intended 
to clarify the meaning of the already exiting guideline.  The 
government points out that when an amendment to a guideline is 
intended to clarify the meaning of the existing guideline, the 
court must give it substantial weight in interpreting that 
guideline.  See United States v. Joshua, 976 F.2d 844, 853 (3d 
Cir. 1992); United States v. Ofchinick, 877 F.2d 251, 257 n.9 (3d 
Cir. 1989).  In fact, the Ninth Circuit relied on precisely such 
reasoning to hold that "section 2Q2.1(b)(3)(A) was never intended 
to apply solely to `specially protected' wildlife after its 
consolidation."  United States v. Atkinson, 966 F.2d 1270, 1276 
(9th Cir. 1992).  But the Ninth Circuit did not reach this 
conclusion in the context of an ex post facto challenge and, in 
any case, we disagree.   
 First, we have never held that a "clarifying" amendment 
can be used to interpret an earlier guideline when applying the 
amendment would punish the defendant more harshly than he would 
have been punished under the court's independent interpretation 
of the pre-amendment language.  Second, the amendment here was 
not a clarification.  It indicated that the language "specially 
protected" had been inadvertently retained when the guidelines 
were amended in 1989; it did not state that the 1989 guideline 
applied to seafood that was not "specially protected."  Third, 
[w]here the Commission adopts an interpretive 
commentary amendment that the text of the 
guideline cannot reasonably support, the 
Commission circumvents the process Congress 
has established for amending the guidelines. 
When this happens, we should decline to 
follow its lead. 
 
Joshua, 976 F.2d at 854.  No interpretive amendment can excise 
key words ("specially protected") from a guideline.  And no 
individual who read the guidelines before 1989 while 
contemplating his likely fate if he imported valuable shrimp 
would have understood that he was subject to an enhanced sentence 
under the guidelines.  Thus, when resentencing Menon for 
reimporting previously rejected shrimp, the district court cannot 





 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse Menon's 
convictions on Counts 1 through 15, 17 through 32, and 34 through 
139.  We will affirm Menon's conviction on Count 140, and remand 
the case to the district court for resentencing on that Count 
under the 1990 guidelines.     
